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CHARLES S. PELLETT, Appellant, v. SONO'l'ONE COR-
. POHA'l'10~ (a Corporation) ct a1., Respondents. 
[1] Appeal-Law of Case-Sufficiency of Evidence.-A de('il>ioll by 
an appellate court reversing a judglllent of nonsuit thnt the 
evidence might support a jud~mellt for plaintiff is binding on 
a second appeal from a ,iudgment based on a directed verdict 
for defendants, where the evidence is substantially the same 
as that introduced at the first trial. Unless it is shown that 
some essential fact or facts which were proved at the first trial 
were not proved on the second trial, or were conclusively dis-
proved, the .law of the case applies in determining the suffi-
ciency of thf evidence. 
[2] Trial-Direction of Verdict.-The power of the trial court to 
direct a verdict is subject to the same limitations as its power 
to grant a nonsuit. 
[S] ReJease-E1fect--Joint Tort FeasofS: Covenant Not to Sue.-
A. release of one joint tort feasor is a release of all, but a mere 
covenant not to sue one joint tort feasor does not release the 
others. 
[4] Id.-Covenant Not to Sue.-The distinction between a release 
and a covenant not to sue is entirely artificial, since in botll 
cases there is no further recovery from the defendant who 
makes the settlement. The difference in the effect as to third 
persons is based mainly on the fact that in one case there is 
an immediate release. whereas in the other there is merely 
an agreement not to prosecute a suit. 
[5] Id.-Agreement as Constituting Release: Oovenant Not to Sue. 
-An agreement by plaintiff not to levy execution against one 
defendant's property nor make any demand on him to pay 
[1] See 2 Oal.Jur. 967; S Am.Jur. 553. 
[3] Covenant not to sue one joint tort feasor as a release, notes, 
50 A.L.R. 1081 ~ 66 A.L.R. 212; 104 A.L.R. 856; 124 A.L.R. 1309. 
See, also, 22 Oal.Jur. 753; 45 Am.Jur. 476. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 1340; [2] Trial, 
§ 259; [3] Release, §§ 2, 16(4); (4, 7, 10] Release, 12; [5, P] Re-
lease, §§ 1, 2; (8, 8] Release, § L 
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the judgment or any portion thereof in a persolJaJ injury ac-
tion. in return for which said ddenclant ('ovt'llunted to defend 
the action and not to tile the agreement except in th(> event 
any proceedings are commenced by plaintiff in violation of 
the agreement, is not on its face strictly a release or a covenant 
not to sue, although it partakes somewhat of the nature of 
both. 
[6] Id.-What Constitutes a Release.-A release is the abandon-
ment, relinquishment or ~jving up of a right or claim to the 
person against WhOlD it might have been demanded or enforced, 
and its efleet is to extinguish the cause of actioll; hence it may 
be pleaded as a defens(> to the action. 
[7] Id. - Covenant Not to Slie.-A covenant not to sue is not a 
present abandonment or relinquishment of a right or claim, 
but merely an agreement not to enforce an existing cause of 
action. It does not have the effect of extinguishing the cause 
of action; and while. in the case of a sole tort feasor. the cove-
nant may be pl{·aded as a bar to the action in order to avoid 
circuity of action. a covenant not to sue olle of several joint 
tort feasors may not be so pleaded by the covenantee, who 
must seek his remedy in action for breach of the covenant. 
[8] Id. - Agreement as Constituting Release. - An agreement by. 
plaintiff not to levy execution against one defendant's prop-
erty nor make any demand on him to pay the judJnllent or 
any portion thereof in a personal injury action, in return for 
which said defendant covenanted to defend the action and not 
to tile the agreement except in the event any proceedings are 
commenced by plaintiff in violation of the a!n'el:ment, and also 
covenanted to make certain payments within a stated time 
and an additional sum in the event judgment wa!\ entered for 
plaintiff, does not constitute a release since it could not be 
pleaded as a defen!\e to the action and there is no provision 
of the agreement indicating any relinquishment of the right 
of action or that any payment is to be in satisfaction or in 
compromisf' thereof. 
[9] Id.-Agreement as Constituting Release: Oovenant Not to Sue. 
-In the case of covenants not to sue, while it is customary 
for the covenantor to make an express agreement to indemnify 
the· covenantee and hold him harmless in ease of violation of 
the covenants, it is not essential that there be an express 
agreement to that effect, and the covenantee may waive the 
undertaking to indemnify and rely solely on his remedy f?r 
breach of the covenant. Hence, in an agreement by plaintd! 
not to levv execution against one defen~ant's property nor 
make any demand on him to pay the judgment or any portion 
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thereof in a personal inJury action, in return for which said 
defendant covenanted to defend the action and not to file 
the agreement except in the event any proceedings are com-
menced by plaintiff in violation of the agreement, the absence 
of any provision for indemnification does not compel a hold-
ing that the document is a release. 
[10] ld.-Covenant Not to Sue.-An agreement by plaintiff not to 
levy execution against one defendant's property nor' make, any 
demand on him to pay the judgment or any portion thereof 
in a personal injury action, in return for which said defendant 
covenanted to defend the action and not to file the agreement 
except in the event any proceedings are commenced by plain-
tiff in violation of the agreement, cannot be construed strictly 
as a covenant not to sue, since it does not contemplate a cessa-
tion of the existing litigation. However, sinee plainti1f did 
not relinquish his claim or right of action, and merely agreed 
not to levy execution or make demand for payment, the agree-
ment is closely akin to a covenant not to sue, its legal effect 
should be held to be similar, and it does not operate to release 
other joint tort feasors. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Charles S. Burnell, Judge. Reversed. 
Action for damages for negligence in failing to remove from 
plaintiff's ear all of the plaster used in making a east thereof. 
Judgment on directed verdict for defendants reversed. 
Joseph D. Taylor and Russell G. Hager for Appellant. 
Leonard Wilson for Respondents. 
GIBSON, C. J.-This is a second appeal by plaintiff in an 
action for damages for personal injuriC$. On the prior ap-
peal (Pellett v. Sonotone Corp., 55 Cal.App.2d 158 [130 P.2d 
181]) a judgment of nonsuit was reversed. On the second 
trial the court directed a verdict in favor of the defendants. 
and plaintiff has appealed from the ensuing judgment. 
Plaintiff purchased a hearing device from defendant Sono-
tone Corporation. Part of the device consisted of an individu-
ally moulded ear tip which required the making of a plaster 
cast or impl'eflSion of plaintiff's ear. Defendant Brown, a 
salesman and "consultant" for defendant Sonotone, requested 
defendant Compton, a dentist, to make the east, and plainti1f 
and Brown went to Compton's omce for that purpose. Comp-
! 
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ton, assisted by Brown, made the cast. Subsequently plaintiff 
felt a pain in his ear. He consulted an ear specialist and 
learned that a foreign substance was present. Some plaster 
of paris, wax, and cotton were removed. and the pain dimin-
ished and then disappeared, 
[1] Aside from the agreement hereafter referred to. it 
appears that the evidence was substantially the same as that 
introduced at the first trial which resulted in a nonsuit. On 
appeal that judgment was reversed by the District Court of 
Appeal which held (55 Cal.App.2d 158. 161 [130 P.2d 181]) 
that .. Assuming for the purpose of this appeal only that the 
above statement of facts if! true,. we are of the opinion that 
the trial jury might reasonably have believed that defendant 
. Compton and defendant Brown were agent.~ of defendant Sono-
, tone Corporation and that defendant Compton and defendant 
. Brown were negligent in not having used an appropriate in-
strument to examine plaintiff's ear after the plaster ca.c;t was 
made to be certain that none of the plaster or cotton used 
remained in his ear, and likewise that plaintiff was not dila-
,tory in discovering that some of the plaster and cotton had 
been negligently left in his ear." No attempt has been made 
to show that there was any substantial difference in the evi-
dence at the second trial. but even if additional evidence was 
,introduced, any conflict thereby created would be immaterial 
in determining the sufficiency of the evidence. to support a 
judgment for plaintiff. Unless it is shown that some e.c;sentiaJ 
fact or facts which were proved at the first trial were not 
proved on the second trial, or were conclusi1Jely disproved. 
the law of the case applies in determining the suffi~ency of 
the evidence. (Berry v. lIfaywood Mut. W. Co. No. One, 
13 Cal.2d 185, 186 [88 P.2d 7051: lVel1.s v. Lloyd, 21 Cal.2d 
452, 454, 455 [132 P.2d 471].) [3] The power of the trial 
court to direct a verdict is subject to the same limitations as 
its power to grant a nommit (Gindraux v. Maurice :Mercantile 
Co.,4 Cal.2d 206, 208 [47 P.2d 708): Gish v. Los Angeles Ry. 
'Corp., 13 Ca1.2d 570, 572. 573 [90 P.2d 792]), and hence, 
under the law of the case, it must be held that plaintiff had 
made a sufficient showing and was entitled to have the is-
Sues submitted to the jury unless he had released the de-
fendants from liability, 
Defendants claim that the directed verdict was justified 
because they were released by reason of plaintiff's execution 
of a document reading as follows; 
I 
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"WHEREAS, Charle.<; S. Pellett, through his attorney, ha~ 
become satisfied that the defendant. O. L. Compton, in the per-
formance of any acts 01' of hiR nc~ligcnt failure to do anythinl! 
which Rhould have been done; was subject to the direction and 
control and supervision of John E. Brown and the Sonotone 
Corporation. and that any negligence on the part of said Dr. 
G. L. Compton, was not due to any culpahility of the said 
G. r~. Compton. and, 
"WHEREAS, Charles S·. Pellett is also satisfied that a great 
portion of the property of G. L. Compton is exempt from exe-
cution and that the levy of an execution upon any property 
of G. L. Compton will work a hardship upon him, and 
"WHEREAS, in any event. Charles S. Pellett has been ad-
vised by his counsel that the covenant hereinafter made will 
in no wise prejudice his ease or prevent recovery and collec-
tion from the defendant Sonotone Corporation, and the de-
fendant. John R Brown; . 
"Now. THEREFORE, Charles S. Pellett hereby agrees and 
covenants with G. L. Compton as follows: . 
"Said G. L. Compton. as a consideration for the covenant 
hereby made by Charles S. Pellett, does hereby agree to pay 
to the said Charle.q S. Pellett the sum of $10.00 in the event 
a judgment iR entered in favor of Charles S. Pellett and de-
fendant in said action, and said G. L. Comptom agrees to 
pay to said CharIeR S. Penett the sum of $5.00 on or before 
60 days from date hereof in any event and regardless of 
what judgment may be entered in the above entitled action. 
"In consideration of the promiqes herein contained on the 
part of G. L. Compton. CharIeR S. Pe)]ett covenants and agreeR 
with said G. L. Compton that in the event a judgment is en-
tered against said G. L. Compton, in the above entitled action, 
that he will Dot levy execution issued upon said judgment 
against any property of said G. L. Compton and that he will 
make no demand upon G. J.... Compton to pay said judgment 
or any portion thereof. 
"Said G. L. Compton, as further consideration for the cove-
nant herein contained agrees not to file this covenant and 
agreement in the above entitled action, except in the event 
any proceedings are commenced by Charles A.. Pellett eon-
trary to and in violation of this covenant. . 
"Said G. L. Compton further agrees that he will defend 
said action by his attorney in the interests of justice and will 
not withdraw his attorney from said action. until & ~ct of 
) 
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the jury has been rendered or until the court has by di-
rected verdict or non-suit terminated the trial of said action. 
"IN WITNESS WHERROF the parties hereto have signed this 
covenant this day of June, 1941. 
Charles S. Pellett 
Plaintiff 
G; L. Compton, 
Said Defendant." 
Defendants contend that this document constituted a release 
of defendant Compton and consequently a discharge of the 
others. Plaintiff contends that the document was not intended 
to· be and is not a release, or even a covenant not to sue, but 
merely an agreement not to ·levy execution on defendant 
Compton's property and not to make demand on him for 
payment of any judgment rendered. 
It appears that thL'! document was executed while the first 
trial was in progress. and plaintiff's explanation is that "Un-
der ordinary circumstances a dismissal of the case against 
G. L. Compton would have been filed, but because of the dot'-
tor's better knowledge of what had happened in connection 
with the making of the plaster impression and the adverse 
interest which, under plaintiff's theory of the case, he had in 
clearing himself of responsibility by showing that he acted 8.R 
directed by Sonotone Corporation, it was considered naces- , 
sary to have his counsel continue throughout the trial, and 
for that reason the document in question was prepa:r:ed and 
executed." The existence of this document was not disclosed i, 
until the case was called for the second trial when defendant 
Compton tIOught a continuance because his former attorney 
was in miltary service. Plaintiff's counsel opposed a contin-
uance stating that the matter had been settled as to him, but 
refused to give a copy of the agreement to counsel for de-
fendant Sonotone until directed to do so by the trial court. 
Defendant Sonotone then pleaded the agreement in a sup-
plemental answer. 
[3] The rule in this state, applied in many cases, is that 
a release of one joint tort feasor is a release of all (Bee v. 
Cooper, 217 Cal. 96 [17 P.2d 740]; Bogardus v. O'Dea, 105 
Cal.App. 189 [287 P. 149]; see, also, cases cited in 20 McK. 
Dig., p. 615), but that a mere covenant not to sue one joint 
tort feasor does not release the others. (Lewis v. Jf)hnson, 12 
Cal.2d 558,562 [86 P.2d 99]; Kincheloe v. Retail Credit Co., 
Inc., 4 Cal.2d 21 [46 P.2d 971].) There is authority in other 
) 
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jurisdictions for a contrary holding, where the one maJ?ng 
the release reserves his rights against the others, if he has not 
received full satisfaction. (See, Rest., Tol.'flS § 885.) This 
view is illustrated by McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659, which 
proceeds on the theory that it is a question of fact and intent 
whether a settlement is made in full satisfaction or merely 
as the best obtainable compromise; and that a partial satis-
faction taken in compromise does not discharge the other 
wrongdoers. It should be noted, however, that the McKenna 
ease also recognizes the right to contribution among joint tort 
feasors, which is not permitted in this state. 
[4] As pointed out in the McKenna case, the distinction 
between a release and a covenant not to sue is entirely arti-
1leial. .As between the parties to the agreement, the final re-
sult is the same in both eases, namely, that there is no further 
recovery from the defendant who makes the settlement, and 
the di1rerence in the effect as to third parties is based mainly. 
if Dot entirely, on the fact that in one case there is a.n imme-
diate release, whereas in the other there L'I merely an agree-
ment DOt to prosecute a suit. The rule regarding a covenant 
not to sue was apparently adopted as an exception to the strict 
release rule because the courts desired to modify the latter 
rule by indirection. ' 
'[5] There does not seem to be any prior decision involving 
an agreement exactly like that made by the 'plaintiff herein. 
(C/. Schramm v. Brooklyn Heights B.Co., 35 App.Div. 334 
r51 N.Y.s. 945].) On its face the agreement is not strictly 
& Nlease or a covenant not to sue, although it partakes some-
what of the nature of both. 
[6] A release has beer. defined as the abandonment; relin-
quishment or giving up of a right or claim to the person 
against whom it might have been demanded or enforced 
(Black's Law Dict., Ballentine's Law Diet.) and its effect is 
to extinguish the cause of actionj hence it maybe pleaded as 
a defense to the action. ['1] A covenant not to sue, on the 
other hand, is nota present abandonment or relinquishment 
of the right or claim, but merely an agreement not to enforce 
an existing cause of action. It does not have the effect of ex-
tinguishing the cause of action; and while, in the ease of a 
sole tort feasor, the covenant may be pleaded as a bar to the 
action in order to avoid circuity of action, a covenant not to i 
sue one of several joint tort feasors may not be so pleaded by 
the covenantee, who must seek his remedy in an action for 
) 
/ 
./ 
/ 
) 
/ 
712 PELLEl".L' t:. ::)ONOTONE CORP. [26 C.2d 
breach of the covenant. (Sunset Scavenger Corp. v. Oddou, 
11 Cal.App.2d 92, 96 [53 P.2d 188]; Hawber v. Raley, 92 Cal. 
App. 701, 704 [268 P. 943); Matthey v. Gally, 4 Cal. 62, 64 
[60 Am.Dec. 595].) [8] In the present case, plaintiff cove-
nanted that, if judgment was entered against defendant Compo 
ton, he would not levy execution against Compton's property 
or make any demand upon him to pay the judgment or any 
portion thereof. Defendant Compton, on the other hand. 
covenanted that he would defend the action and would not 
file the agreement "except in the event any proceedings are 
commenced by Charles A. Pellett contrary to and in viola- I' 
tion of this covenant." Since no execution could issue or de· . 
mand for payment of the judgment be mad~ until after entry I 
of the judgment, the agreement, according to its terms, could 
not be pleaded as a defense to the action, and hence it lacks 
one of the essential elements of a release. 
The theory on which a release is held to bar a recovery is 
that the plaintiff has accepted payment in satisfaction or in 
compromIse of his right of action, and has released and aban-
doned his right of action in consideration of the payment re-
ceived. In the present case there is nothing in the agreement, 
or in the record, to indicate that the payments of $5 within 
60 days and $10 in the event judgment was entered in favor 
of plaintiff were ever made or that they were intended to or 
did constitute any payment in satisfaction, in whole or in 
part, or in compromise, of the right of action. There is no 
provision of the agreement indicating any release or relin-
quishment of the right of action. and the agreement cannot 
be construed as a release. 
[9] In the case of covenants not to sue, while it is cus-
tomary for· the covenantor to make an express agreement to 
indemnify the covenantee and hold him harmless in case of 
any violation of the covenants, it is not essential that there I 
be an express agreement to that effect, and the covenantee 
may waive the express undertaking to indemnify and rely 
solely upon his remedy of damages for breach of the covenant. 
Hence, in the present case, the absence of any provision for 
indemnification does not compel a holding that the docU-
ment is a release. , 
[101 . On the other hand, the agreement does not purport ' 
to be, nor can it be construed strictly to be, a covenant not to • 
sue, since it does not contemplate a cessation of the extorting. 
litigation, but on the contrary provides for continuation of .. 
) 
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the trial and piaceis on defendant Compton the burden of de-
fending the aetion until the rendition of a verdiet or a non-
suit. However, sinee the plaintiff did not expressly or by 
necessary implication abandon or relinquish his elaim or right 
of aetion, or agree to aeeept the payments in satisfaetion of I' 
his' claims, and sinee the agreement according to its terms ' 
could not be pleaded by the covenantee as a defense to the. 
action, . and sinee the only agreement by plaintiff was that he 
\vouldnot levy exeeution on any property of the covenantee 
or make demand upon him for payment of the judgment or 
any portion thereof, we are of the opinion that it is closely 
akin to a covenant not to sue, that its legal effect should ~ 
held to be similar, and that it is not such an instrument as 
will operate to release other joint tort feasors. 
We do not, however, approve the provisions of the agree-
ment which required Compton to defend the suit and bound 
him "not to file this covenant and agreement in the above 
entitled action, except in the event any proceedings are com-
menced by Charles A. Pellett contrary to and in violation of 
this covenant." While the trial court did not find, and we 
cannot hold as a matter of law, that there was any fraud or 
collusion in this case, such an agreement might lead to a fraud 
upon the court by. concealing the position of a' party who is 
an important witness in the action. In the present case, how-
ever, the court and the other parties were fully informed of 
the nature and contents of the agreement prior to the second 
trial, and the court or jury could weigh the testimony of de-
fendant Compton in the light of the knowledge that, since the 
agreement provided that a judgment could not be enforced 
against him, he was not a witness who was adverse to 'the 
plaintiff. Moreover; the validity of the agreement, as between 
the parties thereto, is not at· issue herein. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
TRAYNO~ J.-I dissent. This proceeding involves sep-
arate causes of action against several defendants. (Code Civ. 
Proc., §§ 379 a-ej see Kraft v. Smith, 24 Cal.2d 124, 128 [148 
P.2d 23]; Peters v. Bigelow, 137 Cal.App. 135, 141 [30 P.2d 
450]; Prosser, Torts, p. 1101.) Plaintiff contends that Comp-
ton caused the injury by negligently failing to remove plaster 
'and cotton from plaintiff's ear, and that since he acted as 
/ 
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Sonotonc's agent, Sonotone, as well as Compton, is liable for 
Compton's negligence. Plaintiff also contends that Brown 
and Sonotone are independently liable for his injury, even 
if Compton is not, on the grounds that Brown failed to super-
vise Compton properly nnd advised plaintiff that the pain 
in his ear was to be expected and was of no consequence, and 
that Sonotone gave improper instructions to its agents. 
In my opinion, plaintiff's agreement with Compton covered 
only the cause of action based on Compton's own negligence 
and did not relate io plaintiff's causes of action based on the 
independent acts of negligence of the other defendants. (See 
Ash v. Mortensen. 24 Cal.2d 654. 658-659 [150 P.2d 876]; 
Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liabl1ity, 25 Cal.L.Rev. 413, 
423-425,442-443; Prosser, Torts, p. 1107-1111.) Plaintiff may 
therefore pursue any cause of action involved in this action 
consistent with lack of negligence on the part of Compton. 
As to the cause of action based on Sonotone's liability for 
Compton's negligent conduct as Sonotone's agent, I believe 
that plaintiff is bound by his agreement with Compton that 
the latter was not at fault. He cannot claim that the agree-
men is fictitious in order to pursue a cause of action against 
Sontone based on Compton's culpable conduct as Sonotone's 
agent. 
It is not necessary to determine in this case whetp.er a prin-
cipal who is secondarily liable for negligent conduct of his 
agent is released from liability if the plaintiff makes a com-
promise with the agent wherein the plaintiff for partial satis-
faction of his claim for damages releases the agent. When the 
secondarily liable defendant is a surety, a release of the prin-
cipal debtor ordinarily discharges the debt for which the 
surety is secondarily liable and releases the surety. (Lamb v. 
Wahlenmaier, 144 Cal. 91, 95 [77 P. 765, 103 Am.St.Rep. 66]; 
see Holden v. Mensinger, 175 Cal. 300, 304 [165 p. 950] ; 4: 
Williston, Contracts (rev. ed.) § 1220.) It is also settled that 
a verdict in favor of an agent in a tort action terminates the 
liability of the principal; since that liability is based on the 
agents alleged fault and is incompatible with a verdict deny-
ing blameworthy conduct on the part of the agent. (Bradley 
v. Rosenthal, 154 Cal. 420. 423 [97 P. 875, 129 Am.St.Rep. 
171]; Pimple v. Southern Pacific 00., 38 Cal.App. 727, 731 
[177 P. 871]; see 78 A.L.R. 365; 1 Cal..1ur. 845.) The agree- i 
ment in the present case was not a compromise and did not ; 
give plaintiff partial or full satisfaction for his damages. In 
) 
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my opinion the five dollars to be paid by Compton upon the 
execution of the agreement was only a nominal consideration 
for plaintiff's promise "that in the event a judgment is en-
tel'ed against said G. L. Compton ... he will not levy execu-
tion upon said judgment against any property of said G. L. 
Compton and . . . will make no demand upon G. L. Compton 
to pay said judgment or any part thereof." 
The real significance of the agreement, which was to be 
concea1ed from Sonotone and the court, appears from the cir-
cumstances under which it was made. Those circumstances 
speak for themselves. Any person who introduceS foreign sub-
stances into the body of another must exercise care in re-
moving them (see Ales v. Ryan,S Cal.2d 82, 106 [64 P.2d 
409}; Engelking v. Carlson, 13 Ca1.2d 216, 221 {SS P.2d 
695]; Armstrong v. Wallace, S Ca1.App.2d 429, 439 [47 P.2d 
740J.) Plaintiff could therefore assume that he had a prom-
ising case with respect to the cause of action based on Comp-
ton's negligence and could expect to recover from Sonotone 
the damages caused by the negligence of its agent Compton. 
It is apparent that plaintiff· was interested in maintaining the 
outward appearance of a lawsuit against Compton in order 
to get Compton's testimony as a presumably hostile witness 
to prove Compton's negligence and to make Sonotone respon-
sible for that negligence. Hence the agreement that in sub-
stance provided that Compton's testimony would not make 
him responsible to plaintiff. This scheme made the action 
against Compton a collusive proceeding. It is clear that 
plaintiff expected by this agreement to secure favorable testi-
mony from Compton in his action against Sonotone, and that 
Compton's true performance was to be the giving of favorable 
testimony. Since the contract cou1d not set forth 8Uch an 
immoral consideration it was predicated on the agreement 
that Compton was not guilty of culpable conduct. It pro-
vided: "WHEREAS, Charles S. Pellett, through his attorney, 
has become satisfied that the defendant, G. L. Compton, in 
the performance of any acts or his negligent failure to do 
anything which should have been done, was 8Ubject to the 
'direction and control and 8Upervision of John E. Brown and 
the Sonotone Corporation. and that any negligence on the part 
of said Dr. G. L. Compton, WQ,S not due to any cu?pability of 
,aid G. L. Compton." (Italics added.) 
Plaintiff should be bound by his agreement that there was 
) 
,-) 
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no culpability on Compton's part. He should not be allowed 
to maintain that this agreement waR fictitious after contriving 
to obtain Compton's favorable testimony by promising him 
immunity from liability. (See Civ. Code, § 3517.) He can-
not agree that Compton is blameless and at the same time 
make Compton's principaJ .liable on the basiR of culpable con-
duct of Compton. Fraud would be encouraged if it were held 
that such an agreement has no effect on the principal's lia-
bility, which depends solely on the fault of the agent. The 
public policy underlying the liability of the principal for the 
agent's torts (Otis Elevator Co. v. First National Bank, 163 
Cal. 31, 39 [124 P. 704, 41 L.R.A.N.S. 529]; Bank of Ca,li-
lornia. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 52 Cal. 280, 288; see 
Prosser, Torts, p. 472) has no effect when the plaintiff and the 
agent conspire to make the principal alone responsible for the 
agent's fault .. 
Edmonds, J., concurred. 
